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Abstract—This paper presents a novel watermark generation
technique for the protection of embedded processors. The load
circuit, reported with previous publications, responsible for the
generation of particular power pattern and the majority of water-
mark hardware implementation costs is removed. To compensate
the reduced power consumption and therefore the detection
capability, we emulate the power pattern generation by reusing
the existing clock gated sequential logic. The proposed technique
has been validated through experiments using two ASICs in 65nm
CMOS, one with an ARM Cortex-M0 microcontroller and one
with a Cortex-A5 microprocessor. Silicon measurement results
verify the viability of the technique for embedded processors.
Furthermore, the proposed clock modulation technique demon-
strates a significant area reduction, without compromising the
detection performance. In our experiments the area overhead
reduction of 98% was achieved. Through reuse of existing logic
and reduction of watermark hardware implementation costs,
the proposed clock modulation technique offers an improved
robustness against removal attacks.
Index Terms—Watermarking, Embedded Systems, CPA
I. INTRODUCTION
Technology scaling and innovations in modern processes
are allowing increasingly complex systems to be designed
on a single die [1]. To support this design complexity it is
increasingly desirable to source sub-systems, such as CPUs,
from external Intellectual Property (IP) suppliers. IP blocks
are usually delivered as either hard-macros, full circuit lay-
outs, or soft-macros, typically register-transfer level (RTL)
descriptions. The Virtual Socket Interface (VSI) Alliance [2]
proposes three approaches to the problem of securing an IP:
deterrent, protection and detection. The deterrent approach
may deter the infringement from occurring through patents,
copyrights, trade secrets, contracts or lawsuits [2]. However, it
does not provide physical protection. The protection approach
prevents unauthorized use of IP through encryption. Nonethe-
less, encryption and rights managements support in EDA tools
is far from universal and pain-free [3]. Therefore, IP blocks
are often supplied as unprotected design files that System-on-
Chip (SoC) integrators can use without any complication of
their design flow. As a result, auditing the presence of IP in
finished products is an important challenge for IP providers.
De-encapsulation and die-level reverse engineering can be
used to prove the presence of IP but the process is slow
and costly [3], [4]. It is therefore desirable to identify and
prioritize IP candidates to be short-listed for more thorough
investigation.
The VSI Alliance proposes digital watermarking as one of
detection methods for physical IP protection, at various design
flow levels [2]. The use of the soft IP is more desirable as it
offers the end user the highest level of flexibility [2]. Methods
for the protection of soft IP can be divided into two groups
where architecture of the watermark circuit is closely related
to the detection technique.
Watermark detection at output ports of a device through
application of input vectors has been reported as one of IP
protection techniques in previous work [5]–[9]. Through an
addition of extra states into Finite State Machines (FSM) [5]–
[7], or modification of existing states [8], [9] the area overhead
of watermark implementation is reduced with a reported 0%
in [9]. Nevertheless, the IP vendor may not have sufficient
knowledge about the final design to able to use such detection
techniques and prove the IP infringement.
In [10], Becker et al applied Correlation Power Analysis
(CPA) [11], as a watermark detection technique. The CPA
detects an embedded power watermark in the dynamic or
static current variations on the supply voltage rail. Therefore,
no connections to the input or output ports of a device are
required. However, a power watermark requires two circuits:
a watermark generator and a load circuit [10], [12]. The
architecture of the watermark generation circuit depends on the
watermark sequence. Nonetheless, it is kept relatively small,
and 32 registers have been reported in [10], [12]. The load
circuit consists of shift registers and determines the power
consumed by the watermark circuit. Its size is closely related
to the system size. Zeiner et al report 92 out of 1332 lookup
tables (LUT) on FPGA, a 6.9% of system area, were used
with each LUT configured as 16-bit shift register for simple
arithmetic coder core [12]. Similarly, Becker et al utilize 16
LUTs on the AES cryptographic core [10]. It can be seen,
that the majority of area overhead in the current state-of-the-
art power watermark architecture is caused by the significant
size load circuit.
Embedded processors are increasingly constrained in terms
of circuit area. Moreover, a watermark circuit embedded in the
soft IP design level is the most vulnerable to third party attacks
due to high visibility of the RTL description. It is therefore
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Architecture of (a) current state-of-the-art, (b) proposed clock modulation power watermark circuit
Fig. 2. Functional simulation of current state-of-the-art (middle) and clock
modulation (bottom) watermark architectures
crucial for the power watermark circuit to have negligible
impact on area overhead. The primary motivation of this work
is therefore the minimization of power watermark hardware
implementation costs, necessary for highly constrained embed-
ded processors. In this work, we propose a novel technique to
generate particular power pattern through the modulation of
clock signal without compromising watermark detectability.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
present the current state-of-the-art and proposed clock mod-
ulation architecture of the watermark circuit. The Correlation
Power Analysis watermark detection technique is discussed
in Section III. Silicon measurements are given in Section IV.
Section V, discusses hardware implementation overheads. The
improved robustness against removal attacks of the proposed
clock modulation watermark architecture is shown in Section
VI. Section VII, concludes the paper.
II. CLOCK MODULATION WATERMARK ARCHITECTURE
A power watermark is a redundant circuit added to an
existing IP block, with the aim of superimposing a weak but
deterministic signal on a supply voltage rail. The current state-
of-the-art power watermark [10], [12] implements a watermark
generation circuit (WGC) and a load circuit (LC), Fig. 1(a).
The WGC generates the watermark sequence, 푊푀퐴푅퐾,
which controls the shift enable input of the LC. In Fig. 2,
the functional simulation of the watermark circuit is shown.
The load register consists of an 8-bit shift register initialized
with 1010... pattern to maximize dynamic power consumption
when 푊푀퐴푅퐾 is ’1’. It can be seen, that when 푊푀퐴푅퐾
is ’1’ the shift enable signal is ’1’ and dynamic power is
consumed due to shift operation during which all registers
change their states. Analytical techniques such as Correlation
Power Analysis (Section III), have been reported to detect
deeply embedded watermark signals [10]. However, area over-
head of the watermark circuit in Fig. 1(a) is significant when
compared to area overhead as low as 0% with techniques [5]–
[7] discussed in Section I.
To reduce area overhead we propose a technique which
drives an IP sub-module with the watermark modulated clock
signal as shown in Fig. 1(b). In digital circuits the distribution
of a clock signal on a chip, also known as a clock tree [13],
contributes to the majority of dynamic power consumption.
In [14], the authors report that typically up to 50% of the
total dynamic power is consumed by the system’s clock signal.
Since most of the processor design is sequential with a large
number of registers being clocked, the fan-out of the clock
tree causes high dynamic power consumption. However, not
all registers must be switched every clock cycle and their state
is retained for many cycles before the next update. During
the clock cycles where the data is only retained and does
not change an additional and redundant dynamic power is
consumed due to the clock tree switching signal. To reduce
the dynamic power consumption, the technique was introduced
to switch off the parts of the design when it did not need
to be updated. The technique is known as clock gating and
requires a special clock gating logic cell to be added to
the clock tree. To utilize such a high and intrinsic to the
system dynamic power consumption we propose to modulate
Fig. 3. Simulation results of effect of the watermark power signal on the
total device power
the clock gates of an IP block. The significant size load
circuit reported in previous publications [10], [12] is removed.
The architecture of the WGC is the same and generates
a watermark sequence, 푊푀퐴푅퐾. The original clock gate
control signal, 퐶퐿퐾 퐶푇푅퐿, and 푊푀퐴푅퐾 further control
enable signal of a clock gate of an IP block, as shown in
Fig. 1(b). Analogically, the original clock signal, 퐶퐿퐾, to
the IP block is modified and replaced with the modulated
clock signal, 퐶퐿퐾 푊푀퐴푅퐾. When 푊푀퐴푅퐾 is ’1’,
the clock gate enable is ’1’ and 퐶퐿퐾 is propagated, hence
퐶퐿퐾 푊푀퐴푅퐾 = 퐶퐿퐾. When 푊푀퐴푅퐾 is ’0’, 퐶퐿퐾 is
stopped at the clock gate and 퐶퐿퐾 푊푀퐴푅퐾 = 0. In case
the watermark circuit is active during processor execution,
the entire IP block generates significant dynamic power in
clock cycles when 푊푀퐴푅퐾 is ’1’. However, this may
require an additional synchronization between the watermark
modulated and other IP blocks to ensure data is not corrupted.
Moreover, the size of the IP module must be significant to
generate strong enough watermark power signal, due to the
background noise produced by the rest of the system. In case
the watermark circuit is active while the entire system is
inactive, the watermark power is consumed entirely by clock
tree buffers. As can be seen in Fig. 2, the clock modulation
technique produces higher switching activity in comparison
to watermark architecture implementing a load circuit of Fig.
1(a). This means that clock buffers switch twice in a single
clock cycle during the rising and falling edges of a clock
signal. Therefore the dynamic power consumed in a single
register by clock tree buffers is higher than the dynamic power
consumed by data switching in the same register, as shown in
Section V. In Section IV, we perform experiments on silicon
test chips to validate if watermark power generated in such
way produces high enough amplitude to be detected with
Correlation Power Analysis.
III. WATERMARK DETECTION
Simulation results in Fig. 3 demonstrate the effect of an ad-
ditional watermark circuit on the device total power (in relative
terms). The watermark power signal (middle) is added to the
power consumed by the embedded system (top), and generates
the device total power (bottom). Since the watermark power
signal is a much lower amplitude, it is deeply embedded in the
overall device power signal. We therefore require an analytical
technique which determines the possibility and the accuracy of
watermark existence. Such a technique is Correlation Power
Analysis (CPA) [11]. It requires information extracted from
the measured power consumption of a device recorded using
an oscilloscope. The CPA measures the relationship between
the expected (watermark sequence) and measured signals, as
shown in (1).
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The watermark model vector, 푋 , can be represented by a
binary sequence. The sampling frequency of an oscilloscope,
푓푠, is much greater than the frequency of the system clock,
푓푐푙푘, i.e. 푓푠 >> 푓푐푙푘. Hence, the measured signal is repre-
sented as vector, 푌 , where each value is the average of power
consumed in a single clock cycle. The result is known as
correlation coefficient, 휌 [11]. It can vary from -1 to 1, with
1 representing two identical signals, and -1 representing two
identical but inverted signals. When 휌 is 0, no relationship
occurs. Since both signals can be out of phase, the watermark
vector 푋 is repeatedly rotated by a single clock cycle and 휌 is
recalculated [10]. The number of rotations equals the period
of the watermark sequence. Once all correlation values have
been found, they are represented by a spread spectrum graph
[10], Section IV, Fig. 5. The watermark is only regarded as
detected if a single significant correlation coefficient can be
resolved, as shown in Section IV, Fig. 5(a).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To validate proposed technique discussed in Section II, we
fabricated two ASIC designs in TSMC 65nm low leakage
CMOS technology, with nominal operating voltage of 1.2V.
The designs were completed using industry standard EDA
tools. In the first design (chip I), the watermark circuit was
embedded as a hard macro block, on a separate power domain.
The SoC consists of the ARM Cortex-M0 microprocessor IP
core, along with an on-chip bus and numerous commercial
IP blocks. In the second design (chip II), the watermark
circuit was embedded from RTL description. Therefore, the
watermark circuit was propagated through the entire design
flow, which is closer to the intended usage scenario when
embedding watermarked soft IP. The chip consists of dual core
ARM Cortex-A5 microprocessor IP core and caches. The SoC
consists of the ARM Cortex-M0 and the watermark circuit.
The watermark circuit architecture is the same in both chips,
Fig. 4(a). The WGC contains two sequence generators which
can be configured as either 32-bit Linear Feedback Shift Regis-
ters or simple 32-bit circular shift registers. In our experiments,
we used only a single sequence generator configured as 12-
bit Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR), which generated
12-bit maximum length sequence at 푊푀퐴푅퐾 output signal.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. (a) Schematic diagram of the clock modulated watermark circuit embedded in test chips. (b) Test board
The redundant logic circuit contains 1,024 registers, divided
into 32 words. The clock signal to each 32-bit word is clock
gated using the clock gate cell (ICG). The clock enable signal
of each clock gate cell is controlled by 푊푀퐴푅퐾. The
clock signal is propagated through all 32 clock gates when
푊푀퐴푅퐾 is ’1’. When 푊푀퐴푅퐾 is ’0’, the clock signal
is stopped at ICGs and no dynamic power is consumed. All
registers are pre-initialized to ’0’, hence data switching occurs.
It can be seen in Fig. 4(a), that the majority of watermark
dynamic power is consumed by clock buffers embedded in
registers. We can therefore validate the clock modulation
technique from Section II with this experimental setup.
The test board is shown in Fig. 4(b). We connected all
power domains using the power jumpers and measured the
total current consumed by the chip, using the shunt 270푚Ω
resistor. The operating frequency of both chips was 10MHz.
The current signal was measured using an Agilent MSO6032A
oscilloscope with Agilent 1130A active differential probe, at
a sampling frequency of 500MHz. Therefore, we averaged 50
samples per single clock cycle to find the measured power
vector, Y. The number of clock cycles obtained for a single
휌 was 300,000. We attempted to detect the watermark while
running the Dhrystone benchmark, which reflects the activities
of the integer IP processor core, such as integer arithmetic,
string operations, logic decisions and memory accesses in
a general computing application [15], and is one of the
most common benchmarks used in the industry. We executed
Dhrystone benchmark on ARM Cortex-M0 on the SoC, on
both chips. Although, on chip II Cortex-A5 did not execute any
program both cores, along with the on-chip bus were active,
which accounted for a significant portion of background noise
in the system.
The spread spectra of correlation results are shown in Fig. 5.
Since the period of 12-bit maximum length sequence (212−1)
is shorter than 300,000 clock cycles, the watermark sequence
was repeated multiple times within a vector, 푋 . It can be seen,
that the correlation peak for chip I occurs at approximately
the 3, 800푡ℎ rotation of the watermark sequence, Fig. 5(a),
and at approximately the 2, 400푡ℎ rotation of the watermark
sequence for chip II, Fig. 5(c). Since no other correlation peaks
exist we can regard the watermark as detected. To confirm
that correlation peaks were not the result of the correlated
system noise, we disabled the watermark circuit and repeated
experiments on both chips. As can be seen in Fig. 5(b) and Fig.
5(d), no correlation peaks occurred when watermark power
pattern was not present. To investigate the repeatability of
detection results we performed experiments on both chips
100 times. In Fig. 6 correlation coefficients are shown in a
form of a box plot. It can be seen, that medians when 푋
and 푌 were not in phase is close to 0. However, when both
vectors were in phase medians are much higher and distinctive
correlation peak can be distinguished. The variance of all
results represented by the box in the figure accounts for 95% of
all correlation coefficients with extreme values shown as dots.
As can be seen, the correlation coefficient peak is present in all
experiments on both chips. Therefore, an embedded watermark
was successfully detected in all repetitions. The redundant
logic in our experiments is a stand-alone circuit, however, in
the end application a commercial IP sub-module can be reused
with the same results, reducing the area overhead.
V. AREA AND POWER OVERHEADS
The area of the current state-of-the-art watermark circuit
is greatly occupied by the significant size load circuit, as
shown in Section II, Fig. 1(a). In case of system scaling,
the size of the watermark generation circuit does not change,
while the size of the load circuit varies and increases with the
system size. This effect is caused by the Correlation Power
Analysis detection technique which requires substantial water-
mark power signal to detect an embedded watermark circuit.
Various novel detection techniques have been demonstrated
in recent publications [16], [17], which detect an embedded
circuit of negligible size. However, similarly to many soft IP
protection techniques [5]–[9], an access to watermarked design
throughout an entire design flow or access to post-fabricated
design internals are necessary for successful detection. This
is not possible for many IP vendors. The proposed watermark
clock modulation technique enables watermark implementa-
tion at the RTL level with negligible area overhead and allows
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Fig. 5. Spread spectra of correlation results from test chips. Chip I with (a) active, (b) inactive, watermark circuit. Chip II with (c) active, (d) inactive
watermark circuit
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Fig. 6. Box plots of correlation coefficient results from (a) Chip I and (b) Chip II, when experiment was repeated 100 times
TABLE I
POWER CONSUMPTION OF PLACED AND ROUTED LOAD CIRCUIT
Load Circuit Power Consumption Total Watermark
Implementation Dynamic Static Total Dynamic Power
Clock Buffers Modulation 1.51 mW 0.404uW 1.51mW 95.6%No Data Switching
Clock Buffers Modulation 1.80 mW 0.407uW 1.80mW 96.8%256 Switching Registers
Clock Buffers Modulation 2.09 mW 0.407uW 2.09mW 97.2%512 Switching Registers
Clock Buffers Modulation 2.66 mW 0.408uW 2.66mW 98%1024 Switching Registers
post-fabrication watermark detection with the CPA detection
technique. Furthermore, the size of the watermark circuit is
the same for all systems, hence does not need scaling, since
the watermark architecture only requires implementation of
the negligible size WGC.
To determine the area overhead reduction of the proposed
clock modulation technique to the current state-of-the-art wa-
TABLE II
LOAD CIRCUIT IMPLEMENTATION COSTS
Detectable Load Number of Area
Circuit Dynamic Load Circuit Registers Overhead
Power Consumption
푁 = 푃퐿표푎푑/(1.126푢푊 + 1.476푢푊 )
Increase
푃퐿표푎푑
0.25 mW 96 88.9%
0.5 mW 192 94.1%
1 mW 384 96.9%
1.5 mW 576 98%
5 mW 1921 99.4%
10 mW 3843 99.7%
termark implementation demonstrated in Section II, Fig. 1(a),
we estimated the power consumption of the fully placed and
routed watermark circuit, obtained with Synopsys Primetime-
PX using 65nm1 technology library. The power consumption
of the clock modulated redundant load circuit is shown in
1TSMC 65nm low leakage technology library
Table I. In the top of the table, the load circuit is implemented
as shown in Section IV, Fig. 4(a), hence the dynamic power
consumption is caused entirely by clock buffers. We have
found this implementation to account for 95.6% of total
watermark circuit dynamic power. The number of switching
registers is further increased until all 1,024 registers switch
when 푊푀퐴푅퐾 is ’1’. Therefore, the dynamic power con-
sumption is caused by both data switching and clock buffers
modulation. It can be seen, that the dynamic power consumed
by clock buffers is higher than the dynamic power caused by
data switching. We have found that on average the dynamic
power consumption of a single clock buffer is 1.476푢푊 , and
data switching in a single register is 1.126푢푊 . In Table II, the
number of switching registers, 푁 , required to implement the
load circuit of Section II, Fig. 1(a), is shown for various system
sizes. It is based on the required load circuit dynamic power
consumption (in relative terms) to be easily detected with
Correlation Power Analysis. As can be seen, approximately
580 registers are required to implement the load circuit with
the current state-of-the-art watermark architecture, to consume
the same dynamic power as the clock gated redundant circuit
in Section IV, Fig. 4(a). With the proposed clock modulation
technique the dynamic power consumed by clock buffers can
be obtained through the modulation of clock tree buffers of
existing logic, Section II, Fig. 1(b). The watermark generation
circuit requires only 12 registers, hence the area overhead
reduction of 98% can be achieved. Nevertheless, the area
overhead reduction depends on the system size as shown in
Table II. As can be seen, the area overhead reduction is less in
smaller systems, but still significant when compared to the load
circuit watermark implementation. In bigger systems, the area
overhead reduction is close to 100%. Moreover, watermark
implementation can be system specific. Various top level IP
modules or lower level sub-modules can be modulated with
the proposed technique. The power overhead of the watermark
implementation can be therefore tailored to the system.
VI. IMPROVED ROBUSTNESS
One of the major cornerstones of all IP watermarking tech-
niques is the robustness against third party removal attacks.
It is performed with the aim of removing watermark circuit
from the design. In case of soft IP, a removal attack can be
performed at the RTL description level due to high visibility
of the system [2]. Since the current state-of-the-art watermark
circuit implements a significant load circuit the removal is
easily performed. Moreover, as the watermark is a stand-alone
circuit removal has no impact on system performance.
The clock modulation technique proposed in this paper
significantly reduces area overhead of the watermark circuit,
leading to an enhanced robustness to removal attacks. Since,
WGC can be embedded in various sub-modules detection
capabilities of an attacker are significantly reduced. As can
be seen in Section IV, Fig. 4(a) the proposed watermark
implementation does not produce a stand-alone circuit, and
therefore the system’s functionality is greatly impaired when
watermark is removed.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
A novel clock modulation watermark technique for embed-
ded processors has been proposed. The technique was vali-
dated with two ASIC designs and a significant area reduction
has been demonstrated when compared to the current state-
of-the-art watermark circuit architecture reported in previous
publications. Through embedding the watermark circuit in
existing logic, the improved robustness to removal attacks was
achieved.
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